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Plato	  and	  a	  friend	  discuss	  philosophy	  
	  
	  
1.	  The	  Two	  Worlds	  Theory:	  	  preliminary	  remarks	  
he	   'Two	   Worlds	   Theory'	   constitutes	   a	   specific	   interpretation	   of	   Plato's	  
conclusion	   of	   Book	   V	   of	   the	   Republic,	   and	   the	   question	   of	   whether	   it	   is	   a	  
correct	  reading	  or	   the	  only	  reading	  of	   this	   inquiry	  remains	  open.	  The	  Theory	  
argues	  that	  being	  and	  becoming	  are	  separated	  from	  one	  another	  to	  such	  an	  extent	  that	  they	  
constitute	  two	  absolutely	  distinct	  realms,	  which	  seems	  to	  contradict	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	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things	   that	   become	   bear	   a	   likeness	   to	  what	   is,	   i.e.	   the	   Forms.	   The	   potential	   validity	   of	   this	  
claim	  bears	  significant	  consequences	  pertaining	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  being	  and	  not	  being,	  as	  well	  
as	   that	  of	   the	  many	  sensible	  particulars	   that	  bear	   resemblance	  to	  the	  higher	  Forms	  that	  are	  
and	   in	   which	   these	   particulars	   participate.	   This	   alleged	   division	   of	   being	   and	   becoming	   as	  
constituting	   two	  distinct	   realms	  connotes	   that	   these	   two	  phenomena	  are	  entirely	   really	  and	  
conceptually	  distinct,	  and	  this	  connotation	  must	  be	  carefully	  explored	  in	  order	  to	  illuminate	  its	  
implications	  should	  the	  theory	  prove	  to	  be	  the	  case.	  	  
This	   interpretation	   is	   so	   common	   that,	   with	   few	   exceptions,	   it	   has	   become	   a	  
synonym	  for	  "Platonism,"	  but	  it	  is	  usually	  considered	  unsatisfactory	  because	  few	  any	  longer	  
believe	   in	   it	   and	   therefore,	   if	   Platonism	   is	   taken	   as	   being	   such,	   do	   not	   believe	   in	   Plato's	  
relevance.	   Moreover—in	   spite	   of	   efforts	   of	   decades	   before	   and	   after	   David	   Ross'	   Plato's	  
Theory	  of	   ideas—no	  consistent	   interpretation	  of	   the	  Two	  Worlds	  Theory	   through	  different	  
dialogues	  has	  been	  proposed,	  even	  if	  some	  allowance	  is	  made	  for	  Plato's	  "evolution",	  or	  for	  
discarding	  all	  dialogues	  that	  disturb	  any	  such	  interpretation.	  	  
For	  this	  exploration,	  I	  propose	  a	  close	  reading	  of	  the	  text,	  which	  though	  many	  would	  
consider	  a	  naïve	  reading,	  is	  not	  altogether	  inappropriate	  in	  the	  interpretation	  of	  a	  book	  that	  
defends	  several	  times	  the	  need	  for	  a	  clean	  slate.	  Moreover,	  if	  our	  initial	  assumption	  is	  that	  
Plato	  grasps	  an	   important	  truth	  or	  at	   least	  that	  there	   is	  a	  possibility	  of	  this	  being	  the	  case,	  
such	  a	  reading	  would	  have	  merit.	  Let	  us	  proceed	  with	  this	  criterion,	  then.	  	  
	  
2. 	  The	  Formulation:	  conclusion	  of	  Book	  V	  of	  the	  Republic	  and	  further	  notes	  on	  
the	  Two	  Worlds	  Theory	  
	  
At	   the	   end	   of	   Book	   V	   of	   the	   Republic	   (473–480a)	   Plato's	   Socrates	   explores	   the	  
possibility	   of	   a	   capacity	   (or	   power)	   lying	   in	   between	   knowledge	   and	   ignorance,	   and	   of	   an	  
object	   pertaining	   to	   this	   capacity	   and	   lying	   in	  between	   the	   respective	  objects	   of	   knowledge	  
and	   ignorance,	   these	   objects	   being	   "what	   purely	   is	   and	   what	   in	   no	   way	   is",	   respectively	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distinguishes	   each	   capacity;	   Socrates	   suggests	   that	   "…those	   [the	   powers	   or	   capacities]	  
assigned	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  same	  things	  and	  do	  the	  same…	  call	  the	  same;	  those	  that	  deal	  with	  
different	  things	  and	  do	  different	  things…	  call	  different"	  (477c9-­‐d5).	  	  
Socrates	  argues	  that	  knowledge	  is	  a	  power,	  the	  most	  effective	  one,	  and	  then	  inquires	  
into	  the	  nature	  of	  true	  opinion	  or	  belief.	  He	  includes	  belief	  as	  a	  capacity,	  namely	  the	  capacity	  
that	  enables	  one	  to	  believe	  (477c6-­‐d5).	  Given	  their	  shared	  nature	  as	  capacities,	  they	  must	  be	  
set	  over	  a	  particular	  object.	  Knowledge	  is	  set	  over	  what	  purely	  is	  (478a6-­‐7).	  Moreover,	  if	  belief	  
is	  the	  capacity	  to	  believe,	  the	  question	  arises	  of	  whether	  belief	  believes	  the	  same	  thing	  that	  
knowledge	  knows,	  i.	  e.	  whether	  the	  respective	  objects	  of	  belief	  and	  knowledge	  are	  the	  same	  
(478a8-­‐9).	  If	  they	  are	  to	  be	  called	  different	  capacities,	  however,	  then	  they	  must	  by	  nature	  be	  
set	  over	  different	  things;	  it	  therefore	  follows	  that	  the	  object	  of	  knowledge	  and	  that	  of	  belief	  is	  
by	   no	   means	   the	   same	   object	   (478a10-­‐b2).	   On	   that	   same	   note,	   Socrates	   continues,	   if	  
knowledge	   is	   set	   over	  what	   is,	   then	   belief	   must	   be	   set	   over	   something	   else	   (478b3-­‐5).	   He	  
argues,	  however,	  that	  it	  is	  impossible	  for	  belief	  to	  be	  set	  over	  what	  is	  not,	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  
a	  believer	  believes	   in	  something	  and	  that	   it	   is	   impossible	  to	  believe	   in	  no	  thing	  (478b10-­‐11).	  
Therefore,	  since	  what	  is	  not	  is	  the	  object	  of	  ignorance,	  and	  what	  is	  is	  the	  object	  of	  knowledge,	  
then	   "belief	   neither	   believes	   what	   is	   nor	   what	   is	   not"	   (478c6-­‐7)	   —	   i.	   e.	   as	   a	   capacity	   it	   is	  
concerned	  with	  neither.	   From	   this	   it	   follows	   that	  belief	   is	  neither	   ignorance	  nor	  knowledge,	  
but—that	  said—it	  surely	  is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  belief	  lies	  beyond	  these	  two:	  rather,	  it	  "lies	  within	  
the	  boundaries	  determined	  by	  them",	  being	  "more	  opaque	  than	  knowledge	  but	  clearer	  than	  
ignorance"	  (478c8-­‐d).	  This	  therefore	  establishes	  that	  belief	  lies	  between	  the	  two	  capacities	  of	  
knowledge	  and	  ignorance.	  
Having	   successfully	   inquired	   into	   the	   nature	   of	   opinion	   or	   belief,	   the	   in-­‐between	  
capacity,	  Socrates	  proceeds	  to	  explore	  the	  possibility	  of	  the	  in-­‐between	  object	  corresponding	  
to	  such	  a	  capacity.	   	  He	  argues	  that	  such	  an	  object	  "would	   lie	   in	  between	  what	  purely	   is	  and	  
what	  in	  every	  way	  is	  not"	  (478d5-­‐9),	  the	  respective	  objects	  of	  knowledge	  and	  ignorance.	  
Neither	   knowledge	   nor	   ignorance	   would	   deal	   with	   such	   an	   object,	   but,	   rather,	   whatever	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already	  been	  called	  belief	  (478d11-­‐12).	  Such	  an	  object,	  then	  —that	  participates	  in	  both	  being	  
and	   not	   being	   "and	   cannot	   correctly	   be	   called	   purely	   one	   or	   the	   other"—would	   be	   the	  
appropriate	   object	   of	   belief,	   the	   in-­‐between	   capacity,	   "thereby	   assigning	   extremes	   to	  
extremes	  and	  in-­‐betweens	  to	  in-­‐betweens"	  (478e1-­‐4).	  	  
	   Having	  laid	  the	  possibility	  of	  the	  in-­‐between	  object	  out,	  the	  text	  proceeds	  to	  address	  
the	   "fellow	  who	   believes	   there	   is	   no	   beautiful	   itself…	   but	  who	   does	   believe	   that	   there	   are	  
many	   beautiful	   things"	   (476a1-­‐2).	   In	   other	   words,	   the	   person	   who	   believes	   in	   the	   many	  
particulars—that	   participate	   in	   both	   being	   and	   not	   being—but	  who	   does	   not	   believe	   in	   the	  
Forms	  themselves	  that	  are	  (478e6-­‐8,	  479a).	  He	  inquires	  whether	  it	  is	  inevitable	  that	  the	  many	  
just,	  beautiful,	  pious,	  and	  other	  such	  things	  will	  "be	  any	  more	  what	  we	  say	  they	  are	  than	  they	  
will	   be	   the	   opposite"	   (479a5-­‐7,	   b6-­‐7).	   Socrates	   concludes	   from	   this	   that	   each	   of	   the	   many	  
sensible	  particulars	  is	  no	  more	  "what	  one	  says	  it	  is	  than	  it	  is	  not	  what	  one	  says	  it	  is"	  (479b10).	  
These	  particulars	  must	  necessarily	  be	  placed,	  therefore,	  between	  being	  and	  not	  being,	  as	  "one	  
cannot	  understand	  them	  as	  fixedly	  being	  or	  fixedly	  not	  being,	  or	  as	  both,	  or	  as	  neither"	  (479c).	  
Socrates	  reiterates	  that	  "if	  anything	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  of	  that	  sort,	   it	  would…	  be	  an	  object	  of	  
belief,	   not	   an	   object	   of	   knowledge—a	   wandering,	   in-­‐between	   object	   grasped	   by	   the	   in-­‐
between	  power"	  (479d7-­‐9).	  	  
	   This	   constitutes	   the	   'knowledge/belief'	   argument	   in	   the	   conclusion	  of	  Book	  V	  of	   the	  
Republic	  and	  the	  material	  on	  which	  the	  Two	  Worlds	  Theory	  is	  allegedly	  based	  and	  of	  which	  it	  
is	   an	   allegedly	   correct	   interpretation.	   The	   Two	   Worlds	   Theory	   claims	   that	   there	   are	   two	  
distinct	  realms,	  the	  first	  being	  the	  world	  of	  being	  and	  occupied	  by	  the	  Forms;	  the	  second	  being	  
the	   world	   of	   becoming	   and	   occupied	   by	   the	   many	   particulars.	   The	   adequacy	   of	   the	  
relationship	  between	  the	  conclusion	  of	  Book	  V	  and	  the	  Two	  Worlds	  Theory	  must	  be	  explored.	  	  
One	   recalls	   the	   phrase	   "we	   agree	   that	   belief	   is	   different	   from	   knowledge"	   (476d),	  
though	  it	  is	  suggested	  to	  bear	  a	  likeness	  to	  knowledge	  in	  that	  belief	  believes	  in	  something	  and	  
not	  in	  no	  thing,	  in	  something	  that	  in	  some	  way	  bears	  some	  existence.	  The	  Two	  Worlds	  Theory,	  
however,	  presents	  an	  interpretation	  of	  the	  text	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  the	  demarcation	  between	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  of	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  An	  Alternative	  
Reading:	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  Theory	  of	  Blend	  and	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i.e.	  that	  the	  two	  constitute	  entirely	  distinct	  realms	  and	  thus	  that	  the	  difference	  between	  these	  
two	   is	   absolute.	   	   Since	   a	   capacity	   is	   determined	   by	   its	   object	   moreover	   a	   complete	  
demarcation	   between	   being	   and	   becoming	   would	   entail	   a	   same	   demarcation	   between	  
knowledge	  and	  belief.	  This	  controversial	  claim,	  implied	  by	  the	  theory,	  must	  be	  explored,	  as	  a	  
close	   and	   faithful	   reading	   of	   the	   text's	   own	   formulation	   will	   prove	   to	   contradict	   such	   a	  
suggestion.	  
	  
3. The	  in	  between	  and	  the	  particulars,	  introduction	  of	  the	  Blend	  and	  Gradation	  
Theory	  
If	   the	   object	   of	   belief	   participates	   in	   what	   is	   (i.e.,	   in	   the	   object	   of	   knowledge)	   and	  
appears	  to	  be	  a	  lesser	  version	  of	  it,	  insofar	  as	  it	  participates	  in	  it	  but	  is	  not	  it	  (i.e.,	  is	  something	  
different	  from	  it	  but	  bears,	  through	  its	  participation	  in	  it,	  a	  likeness	  to	  it),	  then	  it	  appears	  to	  be	  
not	  only	   in	  between	  what	   is	  and	  what	   is	  not,	  but	   the	  nature	  of	   its	  being	   'in	  between'	   them	  
suggests	   that	   this	   object	   is	   something	   in	   the	   order	   of	   a	  blend,	   as	   it	  were,	   of	   being	   and	   not	  
being,	  a	  blend	  of	  'what	  purely	  is'	  and	  of	  'what	  in	  no	  way	  is'	  together	  in	  what—in	  appearance,	  
at	   least—is	   one	   thing,	   i.	   e.	   one	   particular.	   In	   other	  words,	   if	   the	   object	   of	   belief	   is	   held	   to	  
participate	  in	  both	  what	  is	  and	  in	  what	  is	  not,	  it	  must	  necessarily	  be	  composed	  of	  both	  being	  
and	  not	  being	  in	  a	  blended	  sort	  of	  state,	  and	  since	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  it	  is	  closer	  to	  one	  or	  the	  
other	   would	   seem	   impossible	   to	   determine,	   the	   Blend	   hypothesis	   is	   satisfactory	   as	   an	  
articulation	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  in-­‐between	  object.	  
Bearing	  a	  likeness,	  though	  deficiently	  so,	  to	  what	  is	  but	  falling	  short	  inasmuch	  as	  it	  is	  
not	  what	  is	  necessarily	  suggests	  that	  it	  -­‐	  i.	  e.	  the	  particulars	  as	  object	  -­‐	  also	  bears	  a	  likeness,	  in	  
some	   respect,	   to	   what	   is	   not.	   For,	   as	   its	   seemingly	   blended	   nature	   already	   implies,	   if	   a	  
particular	  is	  like	  the	  Form	  that	  is	  -­‐	  and	  therefore	  like	  being	  -­‐	  but	  deficient	  in	  that	  likeness,	  then	  
it	  must	  also	  bear	  a	  likeness	  to	  something	  other	  than	  what	  is,	  namely,	  to	  no	  thing,	  to	  what	  is	  
not	   -­‐	   notwithstanding	   to	   what	   extent.	   Moreover,	   there	   being	   a	   definitive	   relationship	  
between	  the	  object	  and	  the	  capacity	  that	  deals	  with	  it,	  the	  inference	  of	  particulars	  as	  blends	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for	  Plato's	  	  Theory	  of	  Being.	  	  An	  Alternative	  
Reading:	  The	  	  Theory	  of	  Blend	  and	  Gradation	  
like	   the	   particulars	   (its	   object)	   that	   are	   in	   between	  what	   is	   and	  what	   is	   not,	   the	   objects	   of	  
knowledge	   and	   ignorance,	   respectively	   -­‐	   occupies	   a	   space	   in	   between	   the	   capacities	  
corresponding	  to	  these	  objects,	  knowledge	  and	  ignorance.	  Belief	  would	  therefore	  seem	  to	  be	  
a	  blend	  of	  knowledge	  and	  ignorance:	  the	  object	  being	  a	  blend	  of	  the	  objects,	  the	  capacity	  of	  
the	  capacities.	  
	  
4. Man	   as	   a	   particular	   and	   the	   possibility	   of	   attempting	   knowledge	   under	   the	  
Blend	  and	  Gradation	  Theory.	  Impossibility	  under	  the	  Two	  Worlds	  Theory	  
	  
Moreover,	   the	   seeming	   nature	   of	   particulars	   as	   blends	   of	   being	   and	   not	   being	   has	  
serious	  implications	  for	  man	  and	  is	  in	  fact	  interrelated	  to	  man's	  relationship	  to	  the	  particulars.	  
Any	  attempt	  he	  makes	  to	  come	  to	  know	  the	  Forms	  that	  really	  are	  is	  only	  possible	  through	  his	  
experience	   with	   the	   particulars.	   Man	   conceives	   of	   the	   Forms	   through	   inferences	   from	   the	  
particulars	   that	   point	   beyond	   them,	   and	   due	   to	   the	   illuminating	   fact	   that	   man	   bears	  
similarities	  to	  the	  particulars	  and	  is	  subject	  to	  some	  of	  the	  same	  reality	   insofar	  as	  he	  too,	  at	  
least	   temporally,	   exists	   in	   the	   physical	   perceptible	   world,	   i.	   e.	   the	   world	   of	   the	   sensible	  
particulars.	  Sharing	   in	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  particulars	   in	  this	  way,	  man	  therefore	  both	   is	  and	   is	  
not	   as	  well.	   Like	   the	   particulars,	   he	   is	   but	   not	   fully,	   and	   participates	   in	   both	   being	   and	   not	  
being.	   Moreover,	   the	   natural	   conclusion	   of	   this	   is	   that	   this	   shared	   participation	   does	   not	  
simply	   establish	   a	   relationship	   between	   man	   and	   the	   particulars;	   it	   makes	   man	   himself	   a	  
particular.	  .	  
Man,	  therefore,	  belongs	  to	  the	  world	  of	  the	  sensible	  particulars.	  This	  is	  why,	  following	  
Socrates'	  confession	  of	  not	  having	  knowledge	  of	  the	  Forms	  (506c)	  -­‐	  and	  therefore	  having	  only	  
beliefs	  of	  these	  -­‐	  human	  beings	  are	  not	  able	  to	  have	  full	  knowledge	  of	  the	  things	  that	  are.	  This	  
is	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   human	   beings,	   as	   one	   of	   the	   particulars,	   both	   are	   and	   are	   not,	  
participating	  in	  both,	  and	  thus	  are	  subject	  to	  the	  same	  blended	  nature	  of	  being	  and	  not	  being.	  
Restrained	  by	  this	  blended	  nature,	  and	  only	  partially	  being,	  it	  follows	  that	  man	  could	  not	  have	  
full	  access	  to	  what	  is,	  the	  object	  of	  knowledge.	  Not	  having	  full	  access	  to	  its	  object,	  therefore,	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for	  Plato's	  	  Theory	  of	  Being.	  	  An	  Alternative	  
Reading:	  The	  	  Theory	  of	  Blend	  and	  Gradation	  
Given	   this	   shared	   constraint	   with	   the	   sensible	   particulars,	   man	   also	   belongs	   -­‐	   the	  
extent	  notwithstanding	  -­‐	  to	  the	  realm	  of	  becoming,	  an	  entirely	  distinct	  realm	  (separated	  from	  
that	  of	  being	  by	  an	  unbridgeable	  chasm)	  according	  to	  the	  Two	  Worlds	  Theory.	  It	  follows	  from	  
this	   that	   the	   scope	   of	   human	   access	   to	   knowledge	   must	   necessarily	   be	   restrained.	   This	  
restraint	   does	   not,	   however,	   imply	   an	   impossibility,	   insofar	   as	   man,	   as	   a	   particular,	   does	  
participate	   in	  being	   to	   a	   certain	   extent.	   This	  mix	  of	   restraint	   and	  possibility	   of	   the	   scope	  of	  
human	   access	   to	   knowledge	   seems	   to	   suggest	   an	   intermingling,	   a	   blend,	   a	   gradation	   from	  
being	   to	   becoming	   to	   not	   being.	  Otherwise,	   human	   beings	   would	   not	   be	   able	   to	   think	   or	  
conceive	   of	  what	   is	   at	   all	   (i.e.	   there	  would	   be	  no	  knowledge/there	   could	   not	   exist	   even	   an	  
attempt	   at	   knowledge),	  which	   is	  what	   the	   Two	  Worlds	   Theory	   implies.	   This	   impossibility	   of	  
even	   an	   attempt	   at	   knowledge	   would	   be	   in	   place	   if	   there	   were	   not	   a	   gradation	   being	  
manifested,	   a	   blend	   of	   being	   and	   not	   being—since	   the	   nature	   of	   what	   is	   and	   what	   is	   in	  
between	   what	   is	   and	   what	   is	   not	   would	   be	   entirely	   distinct,	   i.	   e.	   comprising	   two	   different	  
realms	  in	  an	  absolute	  sense.	  	  
This	  would	  entail	  that	  the	  objects	  of	  becoming	  bear	  no	  likeness	  to	  what	  is,	  and	  this	  in	  
turn	  would	  entail	  their	  not	  participating	  in	  being	  at	  all—which	  would	  seem	  to	  be	  contradicted	  
by	  Socrates'	  formulations	  in	  the	  text	  itself.	  Moreover,	  this	  alleged	  total	  separation	  of	  natures	  
would	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  the	  case	  simply	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  particulars	  are	  defined	  as	  lying	  in	  
between	  what	  is	  and	  what	  is	  not,	  and	  as	  bearing	  a	  likeness—notwithstanding	  deficiently	  so—
to	  what	   is.	  And	   if	   the	  particulars	  participate	   in	  what	   is,	  and	  from	  there	  bear	  a	   likeness	  to	   it,	  
they	  must	  necessarily	  participate	  in	  none	  other	  than	  the	  same	  nature	  as	  that	  of	  what	  truly	  is.	  
This	  said,	  however,	  through	  our	  alternative,	  "non-­‐chasmic"	  reading	  of	  gradation	  and	  blend	  in	  
the	   relationship	   between	   being	   and	   becoming,	   man	   still	   encounters	   a	   restraint	   at	   full	  
knowledge	   (for	   the	   reasons	   highlighted	   above).	   That	   said,	   the	   Blend	   and	  Gradation	   reading	  
nonetheless	  dodges	  the	  impossibility	  entailed	  by	  the	  Two	  Worlds	  Theory's	  total	  separation	  of	  
what	  is	  and	  what	  both	  is	  and	  is	  not.	  	  
5.	  	  Recapitulation,	  the	  inadequacy	  of	  the	  Two	  Worlds	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have	  presented	  so	  far.	  	  
Sharing	   in	  the	  nature	  of	  what	   is,	   the	  particulars	  cannot	  be	  entirely	  distinct,	  and	  thus	  
entirely	  separated,	  from	  the	  Forms	  (that	  are)	  and	  vice	  versa,	  and	  the	  Two	  Worlds	  Theory	  as	  a	  
potential	   reading	   of	   the	   conclusion	   of	   Book	   V	  must	   be	   false.	   At	   the	   least,	   it	   is	   significantly	  
unequipped	  to	  interpret	  the	  material	  presented	  in	  the	  conclusion	  of	  Book	  V	  of	  the	  Republic	  as	  
a	  whole.	  Such	  a	  claim,	  rather,	  does	  seem	  to	  pertain	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  being	  and	  not	  being	  as	  
constituting	   two	   different,	   entirely	   distinct	   realms.	   As	   mentioned,	   however,	   regarding	   the	  
nature	  of	  the	  object	  of	  knowledge	  and	  the	  object	  of	  belief—i.e.	  what	  is	  and	  what	  is	  between	  
being	   and	   not	   being,	   respectively—such	   a	   theory,	   attempting	   to	   establish	   a	   sharp	   and	  
complete	  distinction	  between	  these	  two	  objects	  and	  thus	  conceptually	  imposing	  an	  erroneous	  
chasm	  or	  void	  where	  in	  reality	  there	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  gradation	  of	  being	  must	  miss	  the	  mark.	  
Again,	  in	  the	  face	  of	  this	  depth	  of	  exploration,	  such	  a	  claim	  as	  the	  one	  the	  Two	  Worlds	  Theory	  
suggests	  would	  seem,	  rather,	  to	  pertain	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  being	  and	  not	  being,	  insofar	  as	  these	  
two	   are	   absolutely	   distinct.	   Pertaining	   to	   the	   relationship	   between	   what	   is	   and	   what	   is	   in	  
between	  being	  and	  not	  being,	  however,	  it	  seems	  very	  significantly	  inadequate.	  
6.	   Acknowledgement	   of	   limits	   of	   both	  models,	   conclusions:	   limits	   to	   the	   Blend	  
and	  Gradation	  	  	  Theory	  due	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  being	  
	  
	   Having	   put	   this	   view	   forth,	   we	   nonetheless	   ought	   to	   highlight	   the	   benefits	   and	  
limitations	  of	   the	  proposed	  Blend	  and	  Gradation	  Theory.	  Opposing	   the	  Two	  Worlds	   Theory,	  
the	   Blend	   and	   Gradation	   Theory	   argues	   that,	   as	   the	   text	   itself	   suggests,	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  
particulars	  (that	  become)	  participate	   in	  both	  what	   is	  and	  what	   is	  not	  necessarily	  entails	  that	  
they	  are	  a	  mix	  or	  blend	  of	  being	  and	  not	  being.	  We	  can	  also	  witness	  a	  gradation	  in	  the	  sense	  
that	  something	  may	  be	  closer	  or	  further	  from	  what	  is.	  In	  another	  sense,	  if	  the	  particulars	  are	  a	  
blend	  of	  what	  is	  and	  of	  what	  is	  not	  and	  are	  not	  completely	  isolated	  from	  either	  of	  these,	  this	  
would	  seem	  to	  entail	  some	  sort	  of	  gradient	  from	  what	  is	  all	  the	  way	  to	  what	  is	  not.	  But	  this	  
also	   seems	   to	   present	   a	   serious	   problem,	   in	   that	   what	   is	   and	   what	   is	   not	   are	   de	   facto	  
completely	  distinct.	  Therefore,	  if	  the	  things	  that	  become	  are	  blends	  of	  being	  and	  not	  being	  by	  




GAUDIUM	  SCIENDI,	  Número	  8,	  Julho	  2015	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
	   	   	  
37	  
Lucas	  S.	  Williams	  
University	  of	  Chicago	  
	  
	  
The	  Inadequacy	  of	  the	  "Two	  Worlds"	  Theory	  
for	  Plato's	  	  Theory	  of	  Being.	  	  An	  Alternative	  
Reading:	  The	  	  Theory	  of	  Blend	  and	  Gradation	  
this	   absolute	   demarcation	   take	   place?	   In	   other	   words,	   following	   our	   logic	   of	   particulars	   as	  
blends,	   and	   of	   being	   and	   not	   being	   as	   completely	   different	   things,	   at	   what	   point	   do	   the	  
particulars	   fully	   lose	   their	   participation	   in	   being	   and	   thus	   cease	   to	   be?	   This	   constitutes	   a	  
profound	  conceptual	  and	  metaphysical	  problem.	  	  
	   This	   essay	   has	   primarily	   been	   dedicated	   to	   exposing	   the	   shortcomings	   of	   the	   Two	  
Worlds	  Theory.	  However,	  we	  have	  also	  just	  outlined	  how	  our	  proposed	  Blend	  and	  Gradation	  
Theory	   also	   faces	   serious	   limitations.	   The	   Two	  Worlds	   Theory	   makes	   even	   an	   attempt	   at	  
knowledge	  an	  impossibility,	  since	  according	  to	  the	  theory,	  being	  (the	  object	  of	  knowledge)	  is	  
completely	  separated	  from	  becoming,	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  particulars	  and	  therefore	  of	  man.	  If,	  
under	  this	  model,	  man	  as	  a	  particular	   is	  completely	  estranged	  from	  what	   is,	  he	  necessarily	  
cannot	  attempt	  to	  come	  to	  any	  sort	  of	  understanding	  of	  it,	  as	  this	  would	  entail	  some	  sort	  of	  
contact	   or	   relationship	   with	   the	   nature	   of	   what	   is.	   This	   stands	   before	   us	   as	   a	   serious	  
obstacle.	  Extrapolating	  a	  sentiment	  expressed	   in	  the	  Meno,	  holding	  this	   impossibility	  to	  be	  
the	   case	   would	   entail	   surrendering	   prematurely	   as	   there	   would	   be	   no	   incentive	   at	   all	   to	  
attempt	  knowledge.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  Blend	  and	  Gradation	  Theory,	  while	  it	  allows	  for	  
the	  possibility	  of	  attempting	  knowledge,	  nonetheless	  presents	  the	  problem	  that,	  if	  becoming	  
is	   to	  participate	   in	  being	  but	  also	   in	  not	  being,	  and	   if	   the	  gradient	  previously	  outlined	   is	  at	  
work,	   at	   what	   point	   does	   the	   complete	   estrangement	   between	   being	   and	   not	   being	   take	  
place?	  In	  other	  words:	  at	  what	  point	  does	  becoming	  lose	  all	  its	  participation	  in	  being,	  all	  its	  
limited	  being,	  and	  thus	  cease	  to	  be?	  At	  what	  point	  does	  becoming	  become	  not	  being,	  if	  this	  
is	  in	  any	  way	  possible?	  The	  Blend	  and	  Gradation	  Theory	  leaves	  the	  loose	  end	  that,	  if	  there	  is	  
a	  participation	  in	  being	  and	  not	  being	  on	  the	  part	  of	  becoming,	  and	  a	  gradation	  from	  one	  to	  
the	  other,	  the	  absolute	  distinction	  between	  being	  and	  not	  being	  seems	  to	  be	  in	  conflict	  with	  
the	  participation	  of	  becoming	  in	  both	  of	  these	  and	  the	  gradation	  this	  would	  seem	  to	  allow	  
for.	  	  
	   This	   in	  mind,	   it	  becomes	  clear	  that	  both	  theories	  are	  deficient	   in	  some	  way.	   It	   is	  not	  
unwise	  to	  conclude	  that	  this	  is	  simply	  due	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  what	  the	  two	  theories	  are	  trying	  to	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being,	   becoming,	   and	  not	   being;	   and	   therefore	   the	   relationship	   between	   knowledge,	   belief,	  
and	   ignorance.	   The	   Two	  World's	   Theory,	   however,	   suggests	   to	   us	   the	   impossibility	   of	   even	  
attempting	  this	  question,	  as,	  under	  it,	  man's	  nature	  as	  a	  particular	  dooms	  him	  to	  face	  a	  chasm	  
between	  his	  realm	  and	  the	  nature	  of	  being.	   In	  this	  sense,	  the	  proposed,	  alternate	  Blend	  and	  
Gradation	  Theory	   is	  significantly	  fitter	  to	  articulate	  the	  problem	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  
being,	   becoming,	   and	   not	   being.	   Under	   this	   model	   -­‐	   one	   more	   faithful	   to	   the	   text	   itself	   -­‐	  
becoming	  participates	  in	  being	  and	  is	  not	  subject	  to	  a	  complete	  estrangement	  from	  it.	  Under	  
the	  Blend	  and	  Gradation	  Theory,	  man	  is	  allowed	  to	  relish	  in	  his	  participation	  of	  what	   is,	  and	  
through	   this	   likeness	   to	   attempt	   at	   least	   some	   form	  of	   understanding	   of	   being.	  Akin	   to	   the	  
formulation	  presented	   in	  the	  conclusion	  of	  Book	  V	  of	  the	  Republic,	   the	  Blend	  and	  Gradation	  
Theory	  allows	  us	   to	  escape	   the	   fate	  of	   the	  pitiful	   fellow	  "who	  believes	   there	   is	  no	  beautiful	  
itself	   (…)	   but	   who	   does	   believe	   that	   there	   are	   many	   beautiful	   things."	   Precisely	   for	   the	  
allowance	  of	  an	  attempt	  at	  knowledge	  and	  an	  access,	  albeit	  to	  a	  limited	  degree,	  to	  being,	  the	  
Blend	  and	  Gradation	  Theory	  better	  captures	  the	  whole	  scope	  of	  the	  formulations	  presented	  in	  
the	   conclusion	   of	   Book	   V	   of	   Plato's	  Republic.	   For	   those	   who	   take	   Plato	   to	   possibly	   offer	   a	  
valuably	   theory	  of	  being,	  one	   that	  may	  actually	   touch	  on	   the	   reality	  of	   things,	   the	  alternate	  
Blend	   and	   Gradation	   Theory	   allows	   the	   hopeful	   prospect	   of	   coming	   to	   a	   preliminary	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